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Abstract
In this paper we compare two solution concepts for general multicrite-
ria zero-sum matrix games: minimax and Pareto-optimal security payoff
vectors. We characterize the two criteria based on properties similar to
the ones that have been used in the corresponding counterparts in the
single criterion case, although they need to be complemented with two
new consistency properties. Whereas in standard single criterion games
minimax and optimal security payoffs coincide, whenever we have multiple
criteria these two solution concepts differ. We provide explanations for the
common roots of these two concepts and highlight the intrinsic differences
between them.
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1 Introduction
Multicriteria zero-sum matrix (MZSM) games are an extension of the standard
two-person zero-sum games, introduced by von Neumann [10], that allow to han-
dle simultaneous confrontation of two rational agents in several scenarios. The
first game theoretical characterizations of minimax values in MZSM games is due
to Shapley [17]. In its introductory note, F.D. Rigby remarks the importance
of these games: “The topic of games with vector payoffs is one which could be
expected to attract attention on the basis of its intrinsic interest”. Nevertheless,
the development of the theory of multicriteria games has not been as successful as
expected. There is a number of references in the literature, although its intrinsic
difficulty, mainly due to the lack of total orderings among players’ payoffs, has
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diminished the interest of researchers (see for instance [2], [5], [7], [8], [11], [12],
[17], [20] and [21] and the references therein). In spite of that, the goal of further
developing the analysis of multicriteria games should not be forgotten. In fact,
each competitive situation that can be modeled as a scalar zero–sum game has
its counterpart as a multicriteria zero–sum game when more than one scenario
has to be compared simultaneously. Moreover, different scenarios do not need
to have the same set (number) of strategies which makes the analysis even more
challenging, as in some scenarios new strategies may appear. In these situations,
applying an extension of the minimax rationale would imply to use the same
strategy in the different scenarios. Thus, conflicting interests appear not only
between different decision-makers but also within each individual, due to the dif-
ferent criteria they may have. For instance, the production policies of two firms
which are competing for a market can be seen as a scalar game. However, when
they compete simultaneously in several markets and the returns in each one of
them cannot be aggregated, the multicriteria approach naturally leads to a mul-
ticriteria game. The main criticism made to this approach is its difficulty to be
applied because in most cases the solutions (values) are not unique. Therefore,
new solution concepts have been proposed and compared with the existing ones.
One of the most attractive alternatives to minimax payoff vectors is the con-
cept of Pareto-optimal security level vectors (POSLV). Pareto-optimal security
strategies (POSS) were introduced by Ghose and Prasad [7] as a solution con-
cept in multicriteria zero-sum matrix games, extending the idea of security level
strategies to more than one criterion where it is allowed to use different strate-
gies in each scenario. Ghose [8] characterized this solution concept as minimax
strategies in a serial weighted zero-sum game, whereas Voorneveld [20] gave an
alternative characterization of these strategies as minimax strategies of an amal-
gamated game (see [1] for the concept of amalgamation of games). Alternatively,
Ferna´ndez and Puerto [5] provided a way to jointly determine POSS and their
corresponding set of payoffs by solving a certain multiobjective linear program.
The main goal of this paper is to highlight the connections and differences
between minimax and Pareto-optimal security strategies in multicriteria zero-sum
matrix games.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we give some
references on related work. In Section 3 we present the basic definitions of the
multicriteria games, in which we will define the two solution concepts to be later
studied. In Section 4 we formally define the minimax solution concept, and
characterize it using a number of axioms. Section 5 is devoted to the definition
and characterizations of the set of Pareto-optimal security level vectors. Section
6 is devoted to analyzing the pairwise logical independence of the properties
used in the presented characterizations. Next in Section 7 we analyze and prove
the relationships between the two solution concepts. The paper ends with some
conclusions drawn from the results in the paper.
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2 Literature review
To provide the necessary properties for characterizing these two procedures we
start by reviewing the literature regarding axiomatizations of solution concepts
in zero-sum matrix games.
The first characterization of the value of a zero-sum matrix game is due to
Vilkas [19]. Later, Tijs [18] addressed the same problem, whereas more recently
Norde and Voorneveld [16] and Carpente et al. [4] provided different axiomati-
zations for the value of standard zero-sum matrix games. Hart et al. [9] give a
Bayesian foundation of minimax values.
Although there exist axiomatic foundations for the minimax value of one-
criteria zero-sum games, there is no characterization for the set of minimax values
in the multicriteria version. On the other hand, there are several axiomatizations
of Nash equilibrium strategies (see e.g. Peleg and Tijs [13], Peleg et al. [14] and
Norde et al. [15]) some of these carry over to multicriteria games, as shown in
Borm et al. [2] and Voorneveld et al. [21]. Nevertheless, these are axiomatizations
for strategy sets rather than for payoffs, they use different sets of axioms, and
they do not clearly show the relationship between the two solutions.
In standard single criterion games, minimax and optimal security payoffs co-
incide. Nevertheless, whenever we have multiple criteria, which in turns may
imply to have a different set (and number) of strategies in each component game,
these two concepts differ: uniqueness and coincidence with security payoffs are
no longer satisfied. This fact raises the question of which are the common roots
and which are the main differences between these two solution concepts. We
will answer this question by providing characterizations that show the common
properties and the differences between them.
We here characterize extensions of minimax and Pareto-optimal security pay-
offs to general multicriteria zero-sum matrix games. Our approach uses classical
properties in game theory and decision theory (objectivity, column dominance,
column elimination, row dominance, row elimination and consistency). The con-
tribution of this paper is twofold:
• we characterize solution sets rather than single value solutions which makes
the analysis more involved. In this regard, we will be interested in finding
the largest set of payoffs compatible with the proposed properties (see e.g.
Calleja et al. [3] or Gerard-Varet and Zamir [6]).
• we use a new consistency property that deals with the persistence of any
solution payoff of a multicriteria game, with given dimension on the space
of criteria, on some lower dimension multicriteria game. The difference
between this new consistency property and the traditional one is the way
in which solutions for a game with k criteria transform into solutions for a
game with k−1 criteria. Extended minimax payoff vectors in a multicriteria
game with k-criteria can be converted to extended minimax payoff vectors
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in a new (k−1)-criteria game that makes a convex combination of two of the
original payoff matrices. However, Pareto-optimal security payoff vectors
become solutions of a game with k − 1 criteria but with an amalgamation
of strategies from two of the previous matrices. This difference is crucial
and distinguishes the two solution concepts.
3 Definitions
Let us begin by recalling the concept of two-person zero-sum games.
Definition 3.1. A scalar two-person zero sum game is characterized by a payoff
matrix A ∈ Rm×n, such that if player I (the row player who wants to mini-
mize payoffs) plays his strategy i and player II (the column player who wants to
maximize payoffs) plays his strategy j, then the row player‘s payoff is aij and the
column player’s is −aij, for i = 1, ..., m, j = 1, ..., n. The set of (mixed) strategies
for player I is
Xm = {x ∈ R
m :
m∑
i=1
xi = 1; xi ≥ 0, i = 1, ..., m},
whereas the set of (mixed) strategies for player II is
Yn = {y ∈ R
n :
n∑
j=1
yj = 1; yj ≥ 0, j = 1, ..., n}.
Note that if player I plays x ∈ Xm and player II plays y ∈ Ym, the expected
payoff of the game is xtAy ∈ R. We define the value of a game A as val(A) :=
maxy∈Yn minx∈Xm x
tAy = minx∈Xm maxy∈Yn x
tAy, which always exists (see [10]).
The traditional multicriteria approach (see Definition 3.2) assumes that the
payoffs of the players are vectors instead of scalars.
Definition 3.2. Consider a payoff matrix A = (A(1), ..., A(k)) ∈ Rm×n×k, with
A(ℓ) ∈ Rm×n ∀ ℓ = 1, ..., k. If player I plays x ∈ Xm and player II plays
y ∈ Yn, the expected payoff for player I is x
tAy = (xtA(1)y, ..., xtA(k)y) ∈ Rk,
and player II gets the opposite. Let D1 denote the class of games defined by
a matrix A ∈ Rm×n×k, and the strategy sets Xm and Yn for players I and II,
respectively.
Note that a game in D1 is uniquely characterized by its payoff matrix, since
the strategy sets only depend on the dimensions of the matrix. We therefore may
identify a game in this class by its payoff matrix.
To compare the two solution concepts that are the goal of this paper, we
analyze them in an extension of the general class of multicriteria two-person zero
sum games D1 just introduced, defined as follows:
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Definition 3.3. Consider a payoff matrix A = (A(1), ..., A(k)) with A(ℓ) ∈
Rm×nℓ for ℓ = 1, ..., k. Let Gk =
⋃
m,n1,...,nk∈N
Rm×n1 × ... × Rm×nk be the set
of all such k-criteria matrices. Define the strategy spaces for players I and II as
Xm and,
Y(n1...nk) = {y = (y(1), . . . , y(k)) ∈ R
n1 × . . .× Rnk :
∑nℓ
j=1 y(ℓ)j = 1; y(ℓ)j ≥ 0,
j = 1, . . . , nℓ, ℓ = 1 . . . k}.
Note that player I has to play the same strategy in all k scenarios, whereas
player II can choose different strategies in different scenarios. We remark that
the pure strategies for both players are the extreme points of Xm and Y(n1...nk).
Choosing the strategy x ∈ Xm for player I and the strategy y ∈ Y(n1...nk) for
player II implies that the payoff of player I is
v(x, y) = xtAy = (v1(x, y(1)), . . . , vk(x, y(k))), (3.1)
where
vℓ(x, y(ℓ)) = x
tA(ℓ)y(ℓ) ℓ = 1, . . . , k. (3.2)
Let D2 denote the class of games defined by a tridimensional payoff matrix A =
(A(1), ..., A(k)) ∈ Rm×n1 × . . . × Rm×nk , and the strategy sets Xm and Y(n1,...,nk)
for players I and II, respectively.
Note that a game in D2 is uniquely characterized by its payoff matrix, since
the strategy sets only depend on the dimensions of the matrix. We therefore may
identify a game in this class by its payoff matrix.
For the sake of notation we will refer to Rm×n1 × . . .×Rm×nk as Rm×(n1,...,nk).
The following example illustrates this class of games.
Example 3.1. Let A and B be two companies that form a duopoly competing
in the same sector. The payoffs of this game will be monetary benefit and public
image, measured in units that are not easily quantifiable economically. Company
A has to face one decision: whether or not to invest in advertising (strategies Y
and N , respectively). Company B has to face two decisions: whether or not to
invest in advertising (strategies Y and N , respectively), and what to do about the
polluting emissions its factory produces. Three different strategies are possible in
this scenario: increase, leave as it is, decrease (denoted by I, L,D).
Both companies know that if the two of them invest in advertising or none of
them does, then their monetary benefit does not increase nor decrease. On the
contrary, if one of them invests and the other does not, the company investing
will have one extra unit of benefit and the other company one less unit of benefit.
If B increases the polluting emissions and A invests in publicity, A will use
this fact in its campaign and the public image of B will deteriorate and that of
A will improve by two units. In case A would not invest in advertising, the extra
emissions will be somehow found out and the public image of B will deteriorate
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and that of A will improve by 1 unit. If B decreases its emissions and A does
not invest in publicity, the public image of B will improve and that of A will
deteriorate by one unit. An advertising campaign of A will compensate this fact
and the improvement/deterioration in public image will be of 0.5 units only.
This situation can be modeled as a game in D2, with m = k = n1 = 2, n2 = 3
and the payoff matrix A = (A(1), A(2)), where A(1) and A(2) are detailed in the
next matrix:
A = (A(1), A(2)) =
( (
0 −1
1 0
)
,
(
−2 0 0.5
−1 0 1
) )
Note that, in order to be consistent with the fact that player I is the minimizer
and player II is the maximizer, the payoffs described before have been multiplied
times -1 when building matrix A. To illustrate, two possible such strategies are:
1. x = (1, 0), y = ((0, 1), (0, 1, 0)). They are two pure strategies that yield an
expected value of the game equal to (0, 0) (the payoff for player I in each of
the two criteria, player II gets the opposite).
2. x = (0.5, 0.5), y = ((0.25, 0.75), (0.5, 0, 0.5)). They are two mixed strategies
that yield an expected value equal to (−0.25,−0.375).
Note that in this framework we identify a multicriteria game with an element
in the cartesian product of the space of matrices. At times, the scalar zero-sum
game defined by the matrix A(ℓ), ℓ = 1 . . . k, will be called the ℓ-component game
of the multicriteria game.
In the sequel, the transpose operator t will be omitted when its use is clear.
Given a matrix B ∈ Rk, we will adopt the following notation:
• Bi· refers to the i-th row of B.
• B·j refers to the j-th column of B.
We will use the following ordering.
Definition 3.4. Given two vectors a, b ∈ Rk, a ≤ b if aℓ ≤ bℓ for ℓ = 1, ..., k,
and a  b if a ≤ b and a 6= b.
v − min (v − max) stands for the set of minimal (maximal) elements with
respect to the componentwise order of Rk.
4 Minimax in D1
The multicriteria extension of the concept of minimax payoff looses some of the
interesting properties shown in the scalar case: uniqueness and coincidence with
security payoffs. In spite of that, it is still possible to establish the existence of
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such strategies under rather standard hypothesis; for instance if the strategy set
is compact the set of minimax payoff vectors is non-empty [11].
The rationale behind minimax strategies is that each player uses the same
strategy in all the k-component games looking for all the non-dominated vector
valued payoffs. This rationale is possible in the domain D1, and so we shall con-
sider multicriteria games defined on this domain to analyze multicriteria minimax
payoff vectors.
Therefore, for each strategy x ∈ Xm of player I let
v − w1(x) := v −max
y∈Yn
(xA(1)y, . . . , xA(k)y). (4.1)
Now, among those strategies that give maximal payoffs in the above problems,
player I will choose the strategies with the best payoff. (Note that best (worst)
must be understood as finding the set of minimal (maximal) elements in the
componentwise ordering of Rk.) We now define the set of minimax payoffs in the
k-criteria zero-sum game domain D1.
Definition 4.1. The set of extended minimax payoffs of the game A ∈ D1 is
given by:
V-minmaxk(A(1), . . . , A(k)) = v −min
⋃
x∈Xm
v − w1(x). (4.2)
According to the above expression the extended minimax payoff vectors are
the non-dominated vectors obtained from the solutions to all the vector valued
maximization problems (4.1) for all x ∈ Xm.
Clearly, if B ∈ Rm×p then V-minmax1(B) = val(B).
After defining the extended minimax payoff vectors, the concept of extended
minimax strategy naturally follows.
Definition 4.2. An extended minimax strategy of player I is any strategy at-
taining an extended minimax payoff vector. (Similarly, one can define extended
maximin strategies of player II.)
The first result about extended minimax payoff vectors in multicriteria games
was given by Shapley [17], who provides a simple way for finding them by solving
zero-sum scalar games with payoff matrix A(α) =
∑k
ℓ=1 αℓA(ℓ), a positive linear
combination of matrices A(ℓ), ℓ = 1, . . . , k.
Theorem 4.1 (Adapted from [17]). Let z∗ be an extended minimax value for the
multicriteria game with matrix A = (A(1), . . . , A(k)) then there exists α ∈ X>k :=
{x ∈ Rk :
∑k
ℓ=1 xℓ = 1, xi > 0, ∀i} such that
∑k
ℓ=1 αℓz
∗
ℓ = val (
∑k
ℓ=1 αℓA(ℓ)).
Conversely, let z∗(α) be the minimax value of (
∑k
ℓ=1 αℓA(ℓ)), then there exists an
extended minimax payoff vector z∗ ∈ V-minmaxk(A), being A = (A(1), . . . , A(k)),
satisfying
∑k
ℓ=1 αℓz
∗
ℓ = z
∗(α).
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4.1 A characterization of the set of extended minimax
payoff vectors
We begin this section by introducing the axioms that will characterize the set of
minimax payoff vectors.
Let {fk}k≥1 be a family of point-to-set maps (correspondences) defined as
fk : Gk −→ 2
Rk
A = (A(1), . . . , A(k)) −→ fk(A).
The axioms needed are:
A.0 Objectivity. For any z ∈ Rk fk(z) = z.
A.1 Monotonicity. For any A,A ∈ Rm×(n1,...,nk) such that A ≤ A, fk(A) ⊆
fk(A) + R
k
−
A.2 Column dominance. Let Ac(ℓ) be the matrix that results from A after
adding to the matrix A(ℓ) a new column which is dominated by a convex
combination of its columns. Then fk(Ac(ℓ)) = fk(A).
A.3 Column elimination. Let A−c(ℓ) be the matrix that results from A after
removing column c(ℓ) from the matrix A(ℓ). Then fk(A−c(ℓ)) ⊆ fk(A)+R
k
−.
A.4 Row dominance. Let Ar be the matrix that results from A after adding
a new row which is dominated by a convex combination of its rows. Then
fk(Ar) = fk(A).
A.5 Row elimination. Let A−r be the matrix that results from A after re-
moving row r. Then fk(A−r) ⊆ fk(A) + R
k
+.
A.6 . Consistency. For any k ≥ 2, if z ∈ fk(A) then there exists 0 < α < 1,
such that
(αz1+ (1−α)z2, z3, . . . , zk) ∈ fk−1(M(αA(1), (1−α)A(2)), A(3), . . . , A(k))
where M(A(1), . . . , A(k)) is a matrix with m rows, labeled i = 1, . . . , m
and
∏
ℓ nℓ columns, labeled c = (c(1), . . . , c(k)) with c(ℓ) ∈ {1, . . . , nℓ} for
each ℓ = 1, . . . , k. The entry in row i and column c = (c(1), . . . , c(k)) of
M(A) equals
∑k
ℓ=1A(ℓ)ic(ℓ). (See [20].)
A.7. Linear consistency. For any k ≥ 2 and A such that nℓ = n ∀ ℓ, if
z ∈ fk(A) then there exists 0 < α < 1 such that (αz1+(1−α)z2, z3, . . . , zk) ∈
fk−1((αA(1) + (1− α)A(2)), A(3), . . . , A(k)).
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Objectivity establishes the evaluation in a trivial situation where the game
has k criteria and both players have exactly one action available. Monotonicity
states that the set of solution payoff vectors should not decrease, in the com-
ponentwise order of Rk, when all the payoff matrices weakly increase. Column
(row) dominance states that the set of solution payoff vectors should not change
if player II (I) can no longer choose an action, in some of the component games,
which is worse for him than a combination of some other actions. Column elimi-
nation states that the set of solution payoff vectors can not increase their values,
in the componentwise order of Rk, when some action of player II in some of the
component games is removed. Row elimination states that when removing an
action of player I the new set of solution payoff vectors must be dominated by
the original one. Consistency states that any solution outcome of a game with a
given dimension, in the criteria space, can be converted into a solution outcome
of a new game with lower dimension of an amalgamated game ‘a` la’ Borm et al.
[1]. Linear consistency states that any solution outcome provided by this corre-
spondence, with a given dimension in the criteria space, can be converted into a
solution outcome of this correspondence with lower dimension by considering a
convex combination of two of the original criteria.
The next result is a characterization of the set of extended minimax payoff
vectors of any general multicriteria zero-sum game.
Theorem 4.2. The set of extended minimax payoff vectors V-minmaxk is the
largest (w.r.t. inclusion) map on D1, the set of multicriteria zero sum games, that
satisfies objectivity, monotonicity, column dominance for k = 1, row dominance
and linear consistency.
Proof: The proof is similar to Theorem 5.4, but using Theorem 4.1 instead of
Theorem 5.2. First of all, we check that V-minmaxk satisfies the properties.
Objectivity It is clear that V-minmaxk satisfies A.0.
Monotonicity Since x ≥ 0 then xA(ℓ) ≥ xA¯(ℓ), for all ℓ = 1, . . . , k. Hence, for
all y ∈ Y 2n , (xA(1)y, . . . , xA(k)y) ≥ (xA(1)y, . . . , xA(k)y), and the property
follows.
Column dominance for k = 1 It is clear that V-minmax1 satisfies column dom-
inance for k = 1 since V-minmax1(B) = val(B) and it is known that the
value function, val(·), of a matrix game satisfies this property (see e.g. [4]).
Row dominance Let Ar =
(
A
b1 . . . bk
)
, bℓ = (b
1
ℓ , . . . , b
nℓ
ℓ ) ∈ R
nℓ , ℓ =
1, . . . , k such that bℓ =
∑m
i=1 αiA
i·(ℓ) with
∑m
i=1 αi = 1 and αi ≥ 0. Take
x = (x1, . . . , xm, xm+1) ∈ X
1
m+1, then for any y ∈ Yn
x
(
A(ℓ)
bℓ
)
y =
m∑
i=1
∑
j∈Iℓ
(xi + αixm+1)aij(ℓ)yj = xˆA(ℓ)y, ∀ ℓ = 1, . . . , k,
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being xˆ = ((x1+α1xm+1), . . . , (xn+αnxm+1)) ∈ Xm. Hence, V-minmaxk(Ar) =
V-minmaxk(A).
Consistency Assume A.7 is not satisfied. Therefore, there exists z = (z1, . . . , zk) ∈
V-minmaxk(A) such that for all 0 < α < 1, (αz1 + (1 − α)z2, z3, . . . , zk) /∈
V-minmaxk−1([αA(1)+(1−α)A(2)], A(3), . . . , A(k)). Hence by Theorem 4.1,
it does not exist (β1, β3, . . . , βk) ∈ X
>
k−1 such that
β1αz1 + β1(1− α)z2 + β3z3 + . . .+ βkzk ∈ val(β1αA(1) + β1(1− α)A(2) +
β3A(3) + . . .+ βkA(k)).
However, this contradicts that z is a minimax payoff vector because by
Theorem 4.1, there must exist (λ1, . . . , λk) ∈ X
>
k , such that
k∑
ℓ=1
λℓzℓ = val(λ1A(1) + . . .+ λkA(k)).
The above contradiction proves that V-minmaxk satisfies A.7.
To finish the proof, it is enough to show that if {gk}k≥1 is an arbitrary family
of point-to-set maps that satisfy A.0, A.1, A.2, A.4 for k = 1, and A.7, then
for any general multicriteria game given by the matrix A = (A(ℓ))ℓ=1...k with
A(ℓ) ∈ Rm×n we get gk(A) ⊆ V-minmaxk(A) ∀ k ≥ 1.
For k = 1, the axioms A.0, A.1, A.2 and A.4 characterize the val(.) function
of a matrix game (see Carpente et al.[4, Theorem 2]). Therefore, g1(.) = val(.) =
V-minmax1(.).
Let z ∈ gk(A), k ≥ 2. Apply A.7 k-times to conclude that there exists α ∈ R
k,∑k
ℓ=1 αℓ = 1, αℓ > 0, such that
k∑
ℓ=1
αℓzℓ = val(
k∑
ℓ=1
αℓA(ℓ)).
Then, by Theorem 4.1, z is an extended minimax payoff vector of the multi-matrix
A. Hence,
gk(A) ⊆ V-minmaxk(A) ∀A, k ≥ 1.
✷
We would like to remark that in our characterization we use maximality with
respect to inclusion. This property is rather important when dealing with set-
valued functions (correspondences) since it ensures that this is the largest object
(solution concept) satisfying the required game theoretic properties. This ap-
proach is not new and has been already used among others by Gerard-Varet and
Zamir [6] for characterizing the ‘Reasonable set of outcomes’ and Calleja et al.
[3] for the ‘Aggregate-monotonic core’.
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The above theorem also implies that V-minmaxk is the largest map on D1
that satisfies Linear Consistency (A7) and that coincides with the value function
on standard single criterion matrix games. Another characterization of extended
minimax payoff vectors using a different set of properties is possible. The ra-
tionale is to alternatively characterize the val(·) function and then to apply the
consistency construction. This is possible based on Carpente et al. [4, Theorem
3].
Theorem 4.3. The set of extended minimax payoff vectors VMmk is the largest
(w.r.t. inclusion) map on D1 that satisfies objectivity, column dominance, row
dominance, column elimination, row elimination and linear consistency.
The proof runs similarly to that of Theorem 4.2 but using [4, Theorem 3]
instead of [4, Theorem 2].
5 POSS in D2
Apart from minimax values, our interest also goes into another solution concept
of multicriteria zero-sum matrix games: POSS. This concept is independent of
the notion of equilibrium, so that the opponents are only taken into account
to establish the security levels for one’s own payoff. Therefore this notion does
not require to play the same strategy in all the k-component games, and thus is
defined in the class D2.
Definition 5.1. Every strategy x ∈ Xm defines security levels v
ℓ
I(x) as the payoffs
with respect to each criterion, when II bets to maximize the criteria [8]. Hence
vℓI(x) = max
y∈Ynℓ
xA(ℓ)y = max
y∈Ynℓ
vℓ(x, y), ℓ = 1, . . . , k, (5.1)
and the security levels are k-tuples denoted by
vI(x) = (v
1
I (x), . . . , v
k
I (x)). (5.2)
Whenever the game we are referring to is not obvious we will use the notation
vI(x,A) to specify such matrix A. It must be noted that for a given strategy
x for player I, the security levels vI(x) might be obtained by different strategies
of player II . In [7] the concept of Pareto optimal security strategy (POSS) is
defined as follows.
Definition 5.2. A strategy x∗ ∈ Xm is a Pareto-optimal security strategy for I
if and only if there is no x ∈ Xm such that vI(x
∗)  vI(x). Similarly, one can
define POSS for II.
The set of Pareto-optimal security level vectors is the set of payoffs that can
be attained by POSS, and will be denoted by VPOSSk(A(1), . . . , A(k)), thus
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V POSSk(A(1), . . . , A(k)) = {z ∈ R
k : z = vI(x) for some x ∈ Xm and
/∃ y ∈ Xm such that vI(y)  vI(x)}. (5.3)
Note that depending on k, the corresponding set is defined on a different
framework space Rk, k ≥ 1.
The following theorem provides a way to determine all POSS and their security
level vectors.
Theorem 5.1. ([5, Theorem 3.1]) A strategy x∗ ∈ Xm is a POSS and v
∗ =
(v∗1, . . . , v
∗
k) is its security level vector if and only if (v
∗, x∗) is an efficient solution
to the problem
min v1, . . . , vk,
s.t. xA(ℓ) ≤ (vℓ, . . . , vℓ), ℓ = 1, . . . , k,∑n
i=1 xi = 1,
x ≥ 0, v ∈ Rk.
Equivalently, Ghose ([8, Theorem 3.3]) and Voorneveld ([20, Theorem 3.1])
characterize POSS strategies as minimax strategies of particular classes of scalar
games.
Theorem 5.2. ([8, Theorem 3.3]) A strategy x∗ ∈ Xm is a POSS for player I in
the multicriteria game if and only if there exists α ∈ X>k = {x ∈ R
k :
∑k
ℓ=1 xℓ =
1, xi > 0, ∀i}, such that
max
(y1,...,yk)∈
∏k
ℓ=1 Ynℓ
k∑
ℓ=1
x∗αℓA(ℓ)yℓ = min
x∈Xm
max
(y1,...,yk)∈
∏k
ℓ=1 Ynℓ
k∑
ℓ=1
xαℓA(ℓ)yℓ.
Theorem 5.3. ([20, Theorem 3.1]) A strategy x∗ ∈ Xm is a POSS for player
I in the multicriteria matrix game A = (A(1), . . . , A(k)) if and only if there
exists a vector α ∈ X>k such that x
∗ is a minimax strategy in the scalar ma-
trix game M(α1A(1), . . . , αkA(k)) being M(α1A(1), . . . , αkA(k)) a matrix with
m rows, labeled i = 1, . . . , m and nk columns, labeled c = (c(1), . . . , c(k)) with
c(ℓ) ∈ {1, . . . , n} for each ℓ = 1, . . . , k. The entry in row i and column c =
(c(1), . . . , c(k)) of M(αA) equals
∑
k
ℓ=1 αℓA(ℓ)ic(ℓ).
The reader may note that in the scalar case, VPOSS1(B) = V-minmax1(B) =
val(B), and theorems 5.1, 5.2 and 5.3 coincide.
5.1 A characterization of Pareto-optimal security payoffs
In this section, we characterize the set of Pareto-optimal security payoffs defined
on a general multicriteria two–person zero-sum game in D2. Thus, we try to
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identify a map (solution concept) that associates to any array of k matrices with
the same number of rows a set of vectors in Rk, k ≥ 1.
Using the above set of properties, we can obtain a characterization of the entire
set of Pareto-optimal security payoff vectors as the maximal (in the inclusion
sense) point-to-set map that satisfies A.0, A.1, A.2, A.4 and A.6.
Theorem 5.4. The set of Pareto-optimal security level vectors V POSSk is the
largest (w.r.t. inclusion) map on D2, that satisfies objectivity, monotonicity,
column dominance, row dominance and consistency.
Proof: First of all, we check that V POSSk satisfies these properties.
A.0 Objectivity It is clear that V POSSk satisfies A.0.
A.1 Monotonicity The security level vectors for the strategy x with respect to
A
vI(x,A) = (maxy∈Yn1 xA(1)y, ...,maxy∈Ynk xA(k))
= (maxy∈ext{Yn1} xA(1)y, ...,maxy∈ext{Ynk} xA(k))
= (max{xA(1)}, . . . ,max{xA(k)}),
where max{xA(ℓ)} denotes the maximum component of the vector xA(ℓ).
Note that this is true because ext{Ynℓ} (the set of extreme points of Ynℓ)
consists of the vectors whose ith component is one and the rest is zero, for
i = 1, ..., nℓ. Analogously,
vI(x,A) = (max{xA(1)}, . . . ,max{xA(k)}).
Now, since x ≥ 0 then xA(ℓ) ≥ xA¯(ℓ), for all ℓ = 1, . . . , k. Hence,
vI(x,A) ≥ vI(x,A), for each x and the conclusion follows.
A.2 Column dominance Let Ac(ℓ)(ℓ) be the matrix that results from adding
to A(ℓ) a new column H that is dominated by a convex combination of the
columns of A(ℓ), i.e., Ac(ℓ)(ℓ) = (A
·1(ℓ), . . . , A·nℓ(k), H) where H is such
that there exists α1, . . . , αnℓ ≥ 0,
∑nℓ
j=1 αj = 1 satisfying
∑k
ℓ=1 αjA
.j(ℓ) ≥
H. It is clear that Ac(ℓ)(s) = A(s), s 6= ℓ.
By construction,
vℓI(x,Ac(ℓ)) = max(xA
·1
c(ℓ)(ℓ), . . . , xA
·nℓ
c(ℓ)(ℓ), xH) = max(xA
·1(ℓ), . . . , xA·nℓ(ℓ)) = vℓI(x,A).
Then, vsI(x,Ac(ℓ)) = v
s
I(x,A) for any s = 1, . . . , k and thus, vI(x,Ac(ℓ)) =
vI(x,A).
A.4 Row dominance Let Ar =
(
A
b1 . . . bk
)
, bℓ = (b
1
ℓ , . . . , b
nℓ
ℓ ) ∈ R
nℓ , ℓ =
1, . . . , k such that bℓ =
∑m
i=1 αiA
i·(ℓ) with
∑m
i=1 αi = 1 and αi ≥ 0. Take
x ∈ X1m+1, then
vI(x,Ar) = (max xAr(1), . . . ,maxxAr(k)).
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The security level of Ar in the ℓ-th component is
vℓI(x,Ar) = max(
m∑
i=1
xiA
·1(ℓ) + xm+1b
1
ℓ , . . . ,
m∑
i=1
xiA
·nℓ(ℓ) + xm+1b
nℓ
ℓ )
= max(
m∑
i=1
(xi + αixm+1)A
·1(ℓ), . . . ,
m∑
i=1
(xi + αixm+1)A
·nℓ(ℓ))
= vℓI(x̂, A),
where x̂ = (x1 + α1xm+1, . . . , xm + αmxm+1) ∈ Xm.
Then for any x ∈ Xm+1, ∃x̂ ∈ Xm, such that
vℓI(x,Ar) = v
ℓ
I(x̂, Ar), ∀ℓ
and conversely.
A.6 Consistency Assume A.6 is not satisfied. Therefore, there exists z =
(z1, . . . , zk) ∈ V POSSk(A) such that for all 0 < α < 1, (αz1 + (1 −
α)z2, z3, . . . , zk) /∈ V POSSk−1(M [αA(1), (1−α)A(2)], A(3), . . . , A(k)).Hence
by Theorem 5.2, /∃ (β1, β3, . . . , βk) ∈ X
>
k−1 such that
β1αz1 + β1(1− α)z2 + β3z3 + . . .+ βkzk = val(M [β1M [αA(1), (1− α)A(2)], β3A(3), . . . , βkA(k)]).
However, this contradicts that z is a payoff vector of a POSS, since by
Theorem 5.3 there must exist (λ1, . . . , λk) ∈ X
>
k , such that
k∑
ℓ=1
λℓzℓ = val(M [λ1A(1), . . . , λkA(k)]).
Thus, V POSSk satisfies A.6.
To finish the proof, it is enough to show that that if {fk}k≥1 is an arbitrary
family of point-to-set maps that satisfy A.0, A.1, A.2, A.4, and A.6, then for
any general multicriteria game given by the matrix A = (A(ℓ))ℓ=1...k with A(ℓ) ∈
Rm×nℓ we get fk(A) ⊆ V POSSk(A) ∀ k ≥ 1.
Indeed, for k = 1, the axioms A.0, A.1, A.2 and A.4 characterize the val(.)
function of a matrix game (see Carpente et al, [4, Theorem 2]). Therefore, f1(.) =
val(.).
Let z ∈ fk(A), k ≥ 2. Apply A.6 k-times to conclude that there exists α ∈ R
k,∑k
ℓ=1 αℓ = 1, αℓ > 0, such that
k∑
ℓ=1
αℓzℓ = val(M [α1A(1), . . . , αkA(k)]).
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Then, by Theorem 5.3, z is a payoff vector of a POSS of the multi-matrix A.
Hence,
fk(A) ⊆ V POSSk(A) ∀A, k ≥ 1.
✷
After a careful reading of the proof one realizes that an alternative character-
ization is still possible using weaker versions of properties A.0-A.4.
Corollary 5.1. If the properties A.0, A.1 ,A.2 and A.4 are required only for
k = 1, the characterization of Theorem 5.4 still holds.
This corollary implies that V POSSk is the largest map on D2 that satisfies
consistency (A6) and that coincides with the value function on standard single
criterion matrix games. Another characterization of Pareto-optimal security level
vectors, similar to the one in Theorem 4.3, is also is possible based on Carpente
et al. [4, Theorem 3].
Theorem 5.5. The set of Pareto-optimal security level vectors V POSSk is the
largest (w.r.t. inclusion) map on D2 that satisfies objectivity, column dominance,
row dominance, column elimination, row elimination and consistency.
Comparing theorems 4.2 and 5.5 we realize that Pareto-optimal security level
vectors and extended minimax payoff vectors differ only in the way in which
solution payoff vectors from k-criteria games are transformed into solution payoff
vectors of (k− 1)-criteria games (consistency properties). The former requires to
amalgamate strategies in a game with lower dimension whereas the latter requires
to do convex combinations of payoff matrices.
6 Pairwise logical independence of the proper-
ties.
This section shows that the previously presented characterizations use pairwise
logically independent properties. In doing that we will use some results from the
literature plus three additional evaluation maps.
First of all, we observe that since properties A0−A7 must hold for any k ≥ 1
it is enough to show that there exist evaluation maps, for particular choices of k,
fulfilling only some of these properties. In most cases, this is possible for k = 1.
We introduce three evaluation maps h0, h1, h2, defined on G1 =
⋃
m,p∈NR
m×p,
the space of the scalar zero-sum games, hi : G1 → R for i = 0, 1, 2, such that for
any B ∈ G1:
h0(B) = 0, (6.1)
h1(B) = b11, (6.2)
h2(B) = min
1≤i≤row(B)
bi1, (6.3)
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where row(B) is the number of rows of the matrix B.
A0: First of all, to show that objectivity (A0) is logically independent of the
rest of properties we use the null function h0. For k = 1, [16] proves that the
null function satisfies monotonicity (A1), row dominance (A4) and row elimina-
tion (A5). It is also easy to see that h0 also satisfies column elimination (A3).
However, it does not satisfy objectivity (A0). In addition, [19] proves using its
function f4 that objectivity (A0) and column dominance (A2) are independent.
A1: For k = 1, the independence of monotonicity (A1) from column domi-
nance (A2) follows from [19, Theorem 4]; from column elimination (A3) easily
follows using our function h1 and from row dominance (A4) and row elimination
(A5) it is proved in [16] using its function f6.
A2: Our function h1 satisfies column dominance (A2) but does not verify
column elimination (A3) nor row elimination (A5); whereas Theorem 4 in [19]
proves that column dominance (A2) and row dominance (A4) are independent.
A3: Our function h1 shows that column elimination (A3) and row dominance
(A4) are independent. The function h2 satisfies row elimination (A5) but does
not satisfy column elimination (A3). Moreover, [16] shows with its function f4
that row dominance (A4) and column elimination (A3) are independent.
A6,A7: Finally, to prove that objectivity (A0), monotonicity (A1), column
dominance (A2), column elimination (A3), row dominance (A4) and row elimi-
nation (A5) are independent of consistency (A6) and linear consistency (A7) we
use the correspondences V-minmaxk and V POSSk, respectively. Examples 6.1
and 6.2 show that V-minmaxk does not satisfy Consistency (A6) and V POSSk
does not satisfy Linear Consistency (A7).
Carpente et al. [4] show that the minimax value satisfies axioms A0 − A5,
although, as shown in the next example, it does not satisfy Consistency.
Example 6.1. Consider the 2-criteria game defined by the matrices A(1) =
(1, 0), A(2) = (0, 1). (Note that player I only has one pure strategy while player
II has two pure strategies in this 2-criteria game.) The minimax values of this
game are (α, 1 − α), ∀α ∈ [0, 1]. The reader may note that these values do not
satisfy Consistence (A.6). Indeed,
M
[
αA(1), (1− α)A(2)
]
=
(
α, 1, 0, 1− α
)
.
It is clear that the minimax value of the single criterion game with the above
matrix is 1. Hence, it can not be a convex combination of (α, 1−α), the minimax
values of the original 2-criteria game, for any α ∈ (0, 1).
Finally, Linear consistency is not satisfied by the Pareto-optimal security
payoffs, as shown in the next example.
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Example 6.2. (6.1 continued)
Consider the game given in Example 6.1, described by the two matrices A(1) =
(1, 0), A(2) = (0, 1). For this game the unique Pareto-optimal security payoff is
(1, 1). Let us now consider the game given by the matrix:
αA(1) + (1− α)A(2) = (α, 1− α).
with 1/2 < α ≤ 1. The value of this game is α. Therefore, the security payoff
does not satisfy the property of linear consistency for any α ∈ (0, 1), because α
cannot be obtained as a convex combination of (1, 1).
The reader may note that the minimax payoff (1, 0) does satisfy this property
for α ∈ [1/2, 1].
Table 1 summarizes the pairwise logical independence of properties.
A0 A1 A2 A3 A4 A5 A6 A7
A0 X h0 (6.1) f4 in [19] h0 (6.1) h0 (6.1) h0 (6.1) V-minmaxk V POSSk
A1 X Th. 4 in [19] h1 (6.2) f6 in [16] f6 in [16] V-minmaxk V POSSk
A2 X h1 (6.2) Th. 4 in [19] h1 (6.2) V-minmaxk V POSSk
A3 X h1 (6.2) h2 (6.3) V-minmaxk V POSSk
A4 X f4 in [16] V-minmaxk V POSSk
A5 X V-minmaxk V POSSk
A6 X V POSSk
A7 X
Table 1: Pairwise logical independence of properties
7 Relationship between minimax and POSS in
D1 and D2
In this section we show the similarities between minimax and POSS by proving
that, when one game in D2 is transformed into a game in D1, then the corre-
sponding POSS transforms into minimax.
In order to introduce our next result we need some further notation. Associ-
ated with any matrix A = (A(1), . . . , A(k)) with A(ℓ) ∈ Rm×nℓ for all ℓ = 1, . . . , k,
let AM(A(1)·j1, . . . , A(k)·jk) ∈ Rm×k be the matrix that results by joining the
columns A(ℓ)·jℓ in A(ℓ), for all ℓ = 1, . . . , k. We observe that there are
∏k
ℓ=1 nℓ
different such matrices depending on the different choices of columns in the ma-
trices of A.
Next, let us denote as EM(A(1), . . . , A(k)) ∈ Rm×k×
∏k
ℓ=1 nℓ the matrix that
results by joining all the different AM(A(1)·j1, A(2)·j2, . . . , A(k)·jk) for all j1 =
1, . . . , n1, . . . , jk = 1, . . . , nk. Now, it is clear that
EM(A(1), . . . , A(k)) =
(
AM(A(1)·1, . . . , A(k)·1), (
∏k
ℓ=1 nℓ). . . , AM(A(1)·n1, . . . , A(k)·nk)
)
.
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Theorem 7.1. A strategy x∗ is a POSS for player I in the k-criteria matrix
game A = (A(1), . . . , A(k)) ∈ D2 with A(ℓ) ∈ R
m×nℓ for all ℓ = 1, . . . , k if and
only if there exists α(x∗) ∈ X>k such that (x
∗, α(x∗)) is an extended minimax strat-
egy in the (
∏k
ℓ=1 nℓ)-criteria matrix game EM(A(1), . . . , A(k)) ∈ R
m×
∏k
ℓ=1 nℓ×k.
Proof. Let αt = (α1, . . . , αk) ∈ R
k such that αℓ ≥ 0 and
∑k
ℓ=1 αℓ = 1; and β
t =
(βj1...jk)j1...jk ∈ R
∏k
ℓ=1 nℓ such that βj1...jk ≥ 0 and
∑
j1...jk
βj1...jk = 1. We observe
that EM(A(1), . . . , A(k))β =
∑
j1...jk
βj1...jkAM(A(1)
·j1 , . . . , A(k)·jk) ∈ Rm×k,
and M(α1A(1), . . . , αkM(k))β =
∑
j1...jk
βj1...jk
∑k
ℓ=1 αℓA(ℓ)
·jℓ ∈ Rm. Therefore,
(EM((A(1), . . . , EM(k))β)α =
k∑
ℓ=1
αℓ
∑
j1...jk
βj1...jkAM(A(1)
·j1, . . . , A(k)·jk),
=
∑
j1...jk
βj1...jk
k∑
ℓ=1
αℓA(ℓ)
·jℓ
= M(α1A(1), . . . , αkM(k))β.
Now, we know that x∗ is a POSS for player I if and only if it exists αt =
(α1, . . . , αk) ∈ R
k satisfying αℓ ≥ 0 and
∑k
ℓ=1 αℓ = 1 such that x
∗ is a minimax
strategy for single criterion game M(α1A(1), . . . , αkM(k)). This is equivalent to
satisfy that
max
β
(x∗)tM(α1A(1), . . . , αkA(k))β = min
x∈X>m
max
β
xtM(α1A(1), . . . , αkA(k))β.
Let β∗ be the element where the above maximum is attained. In particular
(x∗)tM(α1A(1), . . . , αkA(k))β
∗ = min
x∈X>m
xtM(α1A(1), . . . , αkA(k))β
∗.
This is equivalent to
m∑
i=1
x∗i
∑
j1...jk
β∗j1...jk
k∑
ℓ=1
αℓA(ℓ)
·jℓ = min
x∈X>m
m∑
i=1
xi
∑
j1...jk
β∗j1...jk
k∑
ℓ=1
αℓA(ℓ)
·jℓ
= min
x∈X>m
m∑
i=1
xi
k∑
ℓ=1
αℓ
∑
j1...jk
β∗j1...jkAM(A(1)
·j1 , . . . , A(k)·jk )
(
by scalar minimax theorem applied to matrix∑
j1...jk
β∗j1...jk
AM(A(1)·j1 , . . . , A(k)·jk )
)
= min
x∈X>m
m∑
i=1
xi
k∑
ℓ=1
αℓ
∑
j1...jk
β∗j1...jkAM(A(1)
·j1 , . . . , A(k)·jk )
This last equation means that x∗ is also a minimax strategy for the single criterion
game with matrix
∑
j1...jk
β∗j1...jkAM(A(1)
·j1 , . . . , A(k)·jk) ∈ Rm×k where β∗ is the
element where the above maximum is attained. This last matrix is the convex
combination with coefficient β∗ of the matrices AM(A(1)·j1, . . . , A(k)·jk) therefore
by applying Theorem 4.1, it follows that x∗ is also an extended minimax strategy
of the multicriteria game with matrix(
AM(A(1)·1, . . . , A(k)·1), (
∏k
ℓ=1 nℓ). . . , AM(A(1)·n1 , . . . , A(k)·nk)
)
.
This matrix is by definition EM(A(1), . . . , A(k)) which concludes the proof.
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The next results shows another transformation of a game in D2 into a game
in D1.
Theorem 7.2. Every game A ∈ D2 can be transformed into a game A¯ ∈ D1. Be-
sides, given (x, y) strategies in A for players I and II, there exists (x¯, y¯) strategies
for I and II in A¯ such that xAy = x¯A¯y¯.
Proof. Given is A = (A(1), ..., A(k)), with A(ℓ) ∈ Rm×nℓ , which defines a game
in D2. The strategy sets for players I and II are as defined before: Xm, Yn1,...,nk.
Let us define A¯ = (A¯(1), ..., A¯(k)), with A¯(ℓ) ∈ Rm×
∏
ℓ nℓ , which defines a
game in D1, built in such a way that A¯(ℓ)i,(j1,...,jk) = A(ℓ)ijℓ, ∀ i = 1, ..., m, jℓ =
1, ..., nℓ, ℓ = 1, ..., k. The strategy sets for players I and II are Xm (the same as
in game A) and Y¯∏ = {y ∈ R
∏
ℓ nℓ :
∑
(j1,...,jk)
y(j1,...,jk) = 1, y ≥ 0}.
Given two strategies x = (x1, ..., xm) ∈ Xm and y = (y(1), ..., y(k)) ∈ Yn1,...,nk,
define x¯ = x and y¯ : y¯(j1,...,jk) =
∏
ℓ y(ℓ)jℓ.
• Clearly, x¯ ∈ Xm. Let us see that y¯ ∈ Y¯
∏.∑
(j1,...,jk)
y¯(j1,...,jk) =
∑
(j1,...,jk)
∏
ℓ y(ℓ)jℓ =
∏
ℓ
∑
jℓ
y(ℓ)jℓ = 1.
• Now, let us check that xAy = x¯A¯y¯. For this purpose, we need to prove that
xA(ℓ)y(ℓ) = x¯A¯(ℓ)y¯, ∀ ℓ = 1, ..., k.
Take ℓ ∈ {1, ..., k}. Because xA(ℓ)y(ℓ) =
∑
i xi(A(ℓ)y(ℓ))i, and x¯A¯(ℓ)y¯ =∑
i x¯i(A¯(ℓ)y¯)i =
∑
i xi(A¯(ℓ)y¯)i, the proof of this statement reduces to check
that (A(ℓ)y(ℓ))i = (A¯(ℓ)y¯)i, ∀ i = 1, ..., m.
1. (A(ℓ)y(ℓ))i =
∑
jℓ
A(ℓ)i,jℓy(ℓ)jℓ.
2.
(A¯(ℓ)y¯)i =
∑
(j1,..,jk)
A¯(ℓ)i,(j1,...,jk)y¯(j1,...,jk)
=
∑
(j1,..,jk)
A(ℓ)i,jℓ
∏
ℓ′ y(ℓ
′)jℓ′
=
∑
jℓ
(
∑
J\jℓ
A(ℓ)i,jℓ
∏
ℓ′ y(ℓ
′)jℓ′ )
=
∑
jℓ
A(ℓ)i,jℓy(ℓ)jℓ(
∑
J\jℓ
∏
ℓ′ 6=ℓ y(ℓ
′)jℓ′ )
=
∑
jℓ
A(ℓ)i,jℓy(ℓ)jℓ(
∏
ℓ′ 6=ℓ
∑
jℓ′
y(ℓ′)jℓ′ )
=
∑
jℓ
A(ℓ)i,jℓy(ℓ)jℓ = (A(ℓ)y(ℓ))i.
,
where J is sometimes used to denote the complete vector of indexes
(j1, ..., jk).
This proves that (A¯(ℓ)y¯)i = (A(ℓ)y(ℓ))i ∀ ℓ, i, and therefore xAy = x¯A¯y¯.
Example 7.1. Applying the transformation in Theorem 7.2 to the game in Ex-
ample 3.1, the new payoff matrix is:
A¯ =
(
(0,−2) (0, 0) (0, 0.5) (−1,−2) (−1, 0) (−1, 0.5)
(1,−1) (1, 0) (1, 1) (0,−1) (0, 0) (0, 1)
)
,
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If we write the same matrix in a similar way as we did for games in D2, we have
A¯ = (A¯(1), A¯(2)), with:
(A¯(1), A¯(2)) =
( (
0 0 0 −1 −1 −1
1 1 1 0 0 0
)
,
(
−2 0 0.5 −2 0 0.5
−1 0 1 −1 0 1
) )
Note that this new game has two criteria, two strategies for player I, and six
(3× 2) strategies for player II. The strategy sets for the players are X2 and Y6.
If we apply to the original game the transformation in Theorem 7.1 we get:
EM(A(1), A(2)) = Aj = (Aj(1), ..., Aj(6)), where Aj(1) ... Aj(6) are:( (
0 −2
1 −1
)
,
(
0 0
1 0
)
,
(
0 0.5
1 1
)
,
(
−1 −2
0 1
)
,
(
−1 0
0 0
)
,
(
−1 0.5
0 1
) )
Let us denote by D¯1 the class of games in D1 that can be obtained from a
game in D2 as in Theorem 7.2. The following lemma states that strategies in the
game in D¯1 can be transformed into strategies in the corresponding game in D2
keeping the same payoffs.
Lemma 7.1. Let A be a game in D2, and let A¯ be its corresponding transforma-
tion into a game in D¯1. Let (x, y¯) be a pair of mixed strategies for players I and
II in game A¯. Then, there exists a pair of strategies (x, y) for the game A such
that xA¯y¯ = xAy.
Proof. Let (x, y¯) ∈ Xm × Y∏ be a pair of strategies for game A¯. Build y =
(y(1), ..., y(k)) so y(ℓ)j =
∑
(j1,...,jk):jℓ=j
y¯j1,...,jk, for j = 1, ..., nℓ, ℓ = 1, ..., k.
Clearly,
∑
jℓ
y(ℓ)jℓ = 1, and all such components are positive, therefore y ∈
Yn1,...,nk.
Take one of the criteria, ℓ. We have that xA¯(ℓ)y¯ =
∑
i
∑
J xiA¯(ℓ)i,J y¯J , and
xA(ℓ)y =
∑
i
∑
jℓ
xiA(ℓ)i,jℓyjℓ.
The following equation proves that both payoffs are equal:∑
J
A¯(ℓ)i,J y¯J =
∑
J
A(ℓ)i,jℓ y¯J =
∑
jℓ
A(ℓ)i,jℓ
∑
(j1,...,jk):jℓ
y¯J =
∑
jℓ
A(ℓ)i,jℓyjℓ.
The following theorem states that POSS strategies in D2 can be transformed
into POSS strategies in D¯1, and viceversa.
Theorem 7.3. Let A and A¯ be a game in D2 and its corresponding transforma-
tion into a game in D¯1. Then we have that (x
∗, y∗) is a pair of POSS in game A
if and only if (x∗, y¯∗) is a pair of minimax strategies in game A¯, where y¯∗ ∈ Y∏
is obtained from y∗ as in Theorem 7.2.
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Proof. • Let us first see that x∗ is a POSS for I in A if and only if x∗ is
minimax for I in A¯. For any strategy of player II, the worst payoff player I
can obtain from A(ℓ) is the same as the worst payoff he/she can obtain from
A¯(ℓ) (note that the columns of A¯(ℓ) are the same as in A(ℓ), but repeated
and in different order). And therefore the concept of POSS for I in A, and
the concept of minimax for I in A¯ coincide.
• Now let us see that y∗ is POSS for II in A if and only if y¯∗ is maximin for
II in A¯. Because the payoffs are the same in both games, that is, for any
x ∈ Xm, xA(ℓ)y
∗ = xA¯(ℓ)y¯∗, we have that for any strategy of I, the worst
payoff player II can obtain from A is the same as the worst payoff player
II can obtain for A¯, and therefore the concept of POSS for II in A coincide
with the concept of maxmin for II in A¯.
8 Conclusions
Our results in sections 5.1 and 4.1 show that multicriteria minimax and Pareto-
optimal security payoffs are rather similar since they can be characterized with
similar set of properties. The main difference between them comes from the
different form of consistency that each solution concepts satisfies. On the one
hand, in the minimax case the consistency requires weighted sum of matrices,
thus reducing the analysis to games with smaller number of criteria but with the
same set of strategies. On the other hand, in the Pareto-optimal security case
consistency gives rise also to smaller number of criteria but modifying the set of
strategies in one of the scalar component games. This difference is very impor-
tant and it explains the different structure of the corresponding set of strategies:
POSS strategies are well-known to be a connected union of polyhedral sets (see
[5]) whereas multicriteria minimax strategies are not, in general, finite union of
polytopes (see [21]).
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